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„As for myself, even though I were of gypsy stock, and its 
last descendant, still I would do all I can that an honorable 
remembrance should remain after me in the annals of huma­
nity." (Palacký in discussion with Count Sternbcrg and Josef 
Dobrowský, December 1, 1825.) 
„What knows he of England, who only England knows." This Kipling's saying 
may be, of course, applied to all countries. It also applies, at least in eastern Eu­
rope, to such important components of each of those countries as was their peasant­
ry. While, however, educated people in the West spend much of their time in an 
effort to understand themselves by comparing their country to others, it nevěr 
became a hábit in eastern Europe to try to understand their own peasantry, that is, 
in fact, their own people, by comparing it to their neighbors' peasant class. It was 
always believed that preoccupation with the peasantry was below the dignity of 
educated people, and that basic facts to be known about that class were anyway 
so well known as to need no special investigation. Rural eastern Europe knew no 
rural sociology worthy of the name. 
Still, under the surface, there were some differences. In certain east European 
countries the prevailing view was that peasantry was a class for itself, living apart 
from the main stream of national life, a more or less foreign substance in the na­
tional body, uninterested in politics, and therefore devoid of interest for educated 
people. Other countries again regarded their peasantry as the background of all 
their people, a medium from which all urban people somehow escaped and eman-
cipated themselves, and to which they hoped nevěr to return, and for that reason 
among others found uninteresting. 
We see an example of the first type in countries whose intelligentsia recruited 
itself from, or was dosely related to, native nobility, Hungary or Poland in our čase, 
while the other type is represented by Czech, Slovené as well as Baltic countries' 
peasantry, lacking native nobility. The first attitude reminds of that of plantation 
owners to their slaves, the other of the house-negroes to the field-negroes. 
The old Hungarian view of the peasantry is reflected in the following Statement 
made by count Julius Andrássy, the last Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, to 
dr. Sigismund Kúnfi, the right hand man of Béla Kun, on November 11, 1918: 
„You do not know what a malevolent creature such a peasant is, filled with 
the hatred for the towns, the culture, the industrial Proletariat. I know their life, 
their character from direct experience; I live as landlord in the country; I know 
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the physical and moral dirtiness in which they are living. You as socialists, you 
wish laws for the protection of the workers. Do you believe that the peasant 
would favor such measures? You wish a city culture, good elementary schools. You 
are anti-clerical. The peasant is illiterate, would not give a farthing for social and 
cultural aims, he is clerical and anti-semitic. Universal equal suffrage would un-
leash this flood of barbarism upon the whole country, and the very interests of 
the social democratic workers, whom we consider as an element of the national 
culture, would be submerged in this oceán of illiterate, clerical, anti-semitic and 
anti-social peasants . . . K" 
A similar view of the role of Polish peasantry, expressed in a less insulting way, 
may be gathered from a study of the Polish peasantry undertaken by an Ameri­
can scholar: 
„The peasantry until at least the eighteen nineties felt for the most part no 
common bond with the rest of the nation, was hostile to any thought of the resto-
ration of the Polish independence, and looked to the Emperors to defend their 
interests against the Polish schlachta. The landowning and the middle classes, on 
the other hand, regarded the peasantry as outside the pale of the Polish community 
and objected to their acquisition of political and citizen rights 2 ." 
Czech view of their own peasantry, of its character, and of its role in modem 
Czech history was very different, and the above expressed views, had they been 
brought to their attention in the twenties, would make them wonder. Modern 
Czech national life began in the atmosphere which preceeded the revolution of 
1848. In January 1846 appeared the first issue of Pražské noviny, edited by Karel 
Havlíček, the spokesman of the new age. We are told that „although the Czechs 
had begun to fight for an industrial school in the first issue of that páper, nothing had 
been doně for farmers. Not only was the peasant neglected in education, but greater 
damage had been doně by the spirituál down-grading of the simple peasantry that 
had gone on for many years". Havlíček felt that this reflected on the entire nation. 
He stated: „As long as the peasant is ashamed of his own name, the nation cannot 
raise itself." He looked forward to the development of a self-sufficient farming 
class, which he considered the happiest and most important component of a free 
society. To ensure the growth of such a class Havlíček warned against the frag-
mentation of land and urged that family lots be passed on to the eldest son intact. 
As free men, he anticipated that the farmers would not only také care of their 
own land, but also of any communal properties such as pastures and roads. It was 
within such free farming communities he sought the roots of self-government should 
be placed 3. 
Two years later, in an article published in the Národní noviny, Havlíček came 
out with a project how to organize peasantry. Apart from raising the cultural 
1
 J á s z i , Oscar: The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Chicago 1929, p. 228. 
2
 B r o c k , Peter: Boleslaw Wyslouch, Founder of the Polish Peasant Party. The Slavonic 
Review (December 1951). 
3
 K o h á k - K i m m e l , Barbara: Karel Havlíček and the Czech Press. In: The Czech 
Renasccnce of the Nineteenth Century. Ed. by Peter B r o c k and H. G o r d o n -
S k i 11 i n g. Toronto 1970. 
176 
level of the class, such an Organization should develop peasant credit institutions, 
liberating thus their people from the hands of usurers and speculators. 
Füll constitutional life in Austria came to life in 1867, but self-government on 
the local, district and provinciál level existed already since the early sixties. Czech 
cities, dominated as they were by Austrian notables and often by German speaking 
minorities, did not profit from this arrangement as much as the Czech countryside 
which particularly through district self-government gave an opportunity to Czech 
peasantry to break out of the bonds of the local community and, unencumbered by 
any German pressure extend its horizon, set up new goals and test its own strength. 
There were two mass movements in Bohemia, and to a smaller extent also in 
Moravia, in the second half of the nineteenth Century. Both were spearheaded by 
Czech peasantry. The first one took place in 1868—1870 as a protest against dua-
lism, the German-Magyar rule, introduced by the Constitution of 1867. It took 
the form of open air meetings organized in the countryside rather than in cities, 
most of them in the region of the Elbe piain, the samé region which thirty years 
later became the cradle of the Agrarian Party. At the first of these meetings, 
which was held on May 10, 1868 at the foot of the hill of Říp, lying north of 
Prague and associated in Czech mythology with the birth of the Czech Bohemia, 
some 20 000 persons, mostly farmers, participated. Other meetings of the samé 
kind followed in the next months, and then the movement gained popularity and 
became nation-wide. It was estimated that 338 000 people participated in 1868 
at these meetings4. I t took four months before an attempt was made to introduce 
a similar open air meeting in Prague, and when it took place early in October, it 
at once degenerated into a riot which led to the proclamation of martial law on 
October 11,1868. 
The open air meetings held in the country were organized in Prague in May 
at a meeting of secretaries of some sixty self-government districts, and were there-
fore well in hand 5. There was no corresponding Organization behind the Prague 
mass meeting, held in a city whose middle and Upper middle class were still lar-
gely German. 
The second Czech mass movement took place at the end of the eighties. By that 
time Czech people became thoroughly dissatisfied with the policy of their Old 
Czech leaders, the chief complaint being their subservience to the policies of the 
Taafe regime, dominated by its aristocratic and clerical overlords. The Opposition 
again was in the rural districts, four deputies having left in 1867 the Czech Club 
in the Reichsrat to form a Young Czech Opposition. The elections to the Bohemian 
Diet, held in June 1889, ended with a surprising success of the Young Czechs in 
the rural district group which elected 29 deputies as against two in the preceding 
election. The debacle of the Old Czechs became complete two years later in the 
Reichsrat elections, this time largely due to their ill-advised move to sign a pact 
with the Germans which the country rejected. The peasantry became the backbone 
of the victorious party of Young Czechs. 
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There is plenty of other evidence to show the weakness of the Czech cities in 
their struggle against the German domination of Bohemia in the third quarter 
of the nineteenth Century. The first elections to the Bohemian Diet were held in 
March 1861. Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia obtained only one third of the man-
dates. Those mandates were elected by the countryside, while the cities elected 
only German deputies. From the five Chambers of commerce in Bohemia three 
(Prague, Pilsen and Budweis) were lying in Czech regions. Yet until the early 
eighties all the five Chambers of commerce sent to Vienna only German deputies 6. 
In 1859 there were in Prague four German papers with a circulation of 11 014 
copies. There was only one Czech páper with a circulation of 2 260 copies7. The 
liberalization of the regime in 1860 brought to life the Národní listy, the first 
issue of which appeared on January 1, 1861. At the end of that year the páper had 
I 200 subscriptions in Prague and 2 900 in the countryside 8. 
The chief reason for this weakness of the Czech dement in the cities should be 
sought in the generál poverty of Czech urban population. There was not much in-
dustry or banking in Bohemian cities of that period, and what there was was in 
German hands. This led many people especially in Prague to deny their own na-
tionality or at least to be undecided. In 1848 there were in Prague 33 000 Czechs 
and 66 000 Germans. After March 11, 1848 the ratio was the reverse9. In 1856 
the population of Prague had 133 000, of whom 60 000 had been Czechs and the 
rest German. By 1886 the population had grown to 180 000, of whom 150 000 
were Czechs10. This trend then never stopped. The reason was a sudden growth 
of Czech industry, sugar factories and industries producing agricultural machinery 
as well as equipment for the sugar factories first of all. 
Prague has always set the tone to other Czech cities and it did so also in this 
respect. We shall quote the Národní listy of January 9, 1862: 
„In the time before the battle on the White Mountain (1620) Czech cities stood 
at the head of commercial and national progress of our society . . . Nowadays, 
however, when after the woeful and gruesome days of unfreedom the light of free-
dom has brought its blessings to Austria, many cities have lost the trust of their 
environment on account of their ill-chosen, domineering attitude towards the vil-
lage population. The former relationship, when the cities set an example to the 
countryside, has been consequently reversed so that today in many parts of the 
country by its active and energetic behavior the countryside is setting an example 
to the sleepy cities." It is then reported that the people of Kukleny (a suburb of 
the city of Königgrätz) have put through an Organization of markets for their 
products in spite of the Opposition of the Königgrätz notables, who assumed 
haughty airs and had recently created an utraquistic school instead of a Czech 
school people were looking for " . 
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In a similar way Czech element was at that time making inroads by means of 
an agricultural association into the Prague suburbs of Karlín and Smíchov. While 
in December 1860 farmers were invited to the plenary meeting by notices written 
in Czech and German, in June 1863 the Karlin plenary meeting sent only Czech 
notices. In September 1864 this association organized an agricultural and indu-
strial exposition in Karlin 1 2. (The first Czech industrial exposition was held in 
Prague in 1891.) 
It appears that the czechization of „Czech" cities did not result from the faster 
growth of Czech population in those cities, but from gradual penetration of the 
musty German-Czech society by fresh blood coming from the Czech countryside. 
In this way in the second half of the Century there took place a biological regene-
ration of Czech cities, which changed the character of the whole nation. It became 
pushing and uncomfortable, this time no more to Czech cities, but to the political 
and economic dominance of Germans in Bohemia and Moravia. In this struggle 
it was steadily gaining ground before the war. During the war, when in 1917 
constitutional life in Austria was revived, Czech countryside, true to its nature, 
from the outset voiced more resolutely Czech national aspirations then the Young 
Czechs or the Socialists. The role of the Agrarian Party during the war was de-
scribed by a man who served as a link between Šámal, head of the Czech Mafia, 
and Švehla, heading Czech political parties: 
„The Agrarian Party kept silent. Our contacts with the people of this party 
grew and became more intimate. The party as a whole appeared like a bolder 
serving ourselves as well as the activists, and its support was claimed by both. 
One of them will be certainly crushed when that bolder will start rolling. That 
was how I felt, and I was sure that it would not be ourselves. The date of the 
abandonment of the reservě can be exactly determined from the Agrarian press 
and politics: it was in the first half of 1917. That was when America entered the 
war in defense of democracy and the right of nations, and when the first impor­
tant successes abroad,became known. When America entered the war, the leader-
ship of the Agrarian Party was decidedly anti-Austrian and Šmeral and Tusar's 
press used to call us Svehla's radicals 1 3 ." 
It was, for example, the agrarian páper Večer which in May 1917 took the risk 
to publish the bold Declaration of Czech Writers, addressed to the Czech Deputies 
in Vienna, and signed by many writers with the understanding that it would be 
laid before Czech deputies, but not published. The Agrarian Party again was the 
only one of the significant Czech parties, which at the end of 1917, unlike the Young 
Czechs and the Social Democrats, did not have to carry out purges among its 
deputies to get rid of the Austrian activists. 
This shows that there was a great difference between the role of Czech peasantry 
in Czech national life of the nineteenth Century and the role that same class 
played among its neighbors. There are three main reasons to explain this. 
First of all, Czechs in modern times did not have any Czech educated and Czech 
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speaking nobility. Their native nobility having been largely liquidated after the 
Thirty Years War by the Habsburgs, its place was taken over by the victor's co-
horts. As the years and generations went by, some of these could not help identi-
fying themselves with the interests of their country and were taking some pride 
in its great past. It was due to the largess of some of these families that in the 
twenties of the last Century Palacký was able to start his carcer as a hístorian, 
and in 1848 some of these people took part in the revolutionary rising. It was 
largely through their initiative that in the 1860's the Old Czechs Party, the first 
spokesman of Czech people, came to life. With that party, however, the story 
ended. One of the chief charges of the Young Czechs, who in 1891 routed their 
rival, was the subservience of the Old Czechs to Bohemian land owning aristo-
cracy. It was in this intellectual ferment that at the turn of the Century the Agra­
rian Party was born, and incompatibility of the interests of the peasantry and 
nobility became a part of its platform. Unlike the Hungarian or the Sudeten Ger­
man peasantry it was never in the tow and hardly qn speaking terms with the 
noble class and never identified itself with its „patriotic" pathos. It justly suspec-
ted even the patriotism of many Young Czechs when they used it in support of 
their own industrial interests. At the same time the Czech intelligentsia decided 
to east its lot either with the nationalist or the socialist movement. The peasants 
had then to solve through their party the problems in their own way. They had 
soon to learn to stand on their own feet, develop their own philosophy and find 
a way how to reach their own objeetives in an unorthodox manner. In the end 
they sueeeeded largely due to favorable circumstances. 
Shortly after their political emaneipation they were favored by becoming the chief 
sugar-beet growers in Austria, and sugar soon became the most important export 
article of that country. The growing of sugar-beet became the main source of 
income of thousands of Czech villages, and all categories of farmers in the Elbe 
piain took part in i t 1 4 . By and by the sugar-beet growers taught the Czech far-
mer to build organizations which could stand up against the industrial sugar-fac-
tories, whose cartel was for years dietating the price of the sugar-beet until a 
successful farmers' strike in 1909 forced them to come to terms. In 1912 the Czech 
sugar-beet farmers Organization had 40 000 members organized in 1 647 com-
munities 1 5. The sugar-beet farmers had taught the Czech peasant to see his enemy 
first of all in the circles which used nationalism as a pious fraud covering the very 
materiál interests of urban industrial circles. Sugar-beet growing and the pro-
cessing industry became in the seventies the chief national industry 1 6 and in the 
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first years of the new State became its by far most important source of income. What 
was sugar-beet for the low lying regions, industrial potatoes, the raw materiál for 
alcohol for industrial use, became for the higher lying regions. Alcohol distilleries, 
most of them in the new republic in the hands of farmer cooperatives, became the 
bond that held the poor farmer in the Agrarian Party. 
There was yet a third fact that in the end determined the character of Czech 
peasantry. In the eighties the Taafe's conservative regime sought to build a coun-
tervailing power against the liberal capitalism which preceded it. It did so by 
turning attention to the needs and demands of the lower middle class, represented 
by peasantry in the country and artizans in the cities, which like the Catholic 
churdi were either neglected or frowned upon in the preceeding era of unrestrai-
ned liberalism. It had success in Vienna and in Austria as well as among the 
Slovenes and Poles and in Moravia, but ignominously failed in Bohemia, where 
there were strong hussite traditions which were naturally strongest in the protestant 
villages lying in the sugar-beet growing Elbe region. Rather than joining the 
Taafe's conservative „iron ring", largely due to these forces, Czech farmers became 
the backbone of the radical ,anti-clerical Young Czechs helping them to their signál 
success in the election to the Czech Diet in 1889. It is interesting that in the elec-
toral group of the countryside, which, unlike the cities and Chambers of commerce 
went with the Young Czechs, 62 per cent of Young Czech districts were located 
in the sugar-beet growing regions, 27 per cent in the cereal growing and 2 per 
cent in the potato growing areas 1 7. In Moravia, on the other hand, where econo­
mic and political conditions were identical, the absence or a weaker hold of hussite 
traditions made Moravian peasant for a long time the stronghold of the clerical 
party. 
The character of the modern Czech peasantry has in this way been roughly for-
med by the end of the nineteenth Century. In its beginnings, at the turn of the Cen­
tury, the Agrarian Party, the culmination of the aspirations of Czech peasantry, 
was able to hold its ground in its struggle with the maternal party of the Young 
Czechs as well as with Clericals, the least populär of Czech parties, and surpri-
singly enough with the revolutionary Social Democrats. There were two elections 
under universal suffrage in prewar Austria. In the first one, in 1907, the Agra­
rians won 28 mandates as against 26 Young Czechs, 24 Social Democrats and 17 
Clericals. In the election of 1911 there were 37 Agrarians, 26 Social Democrats, 
14 Young Czechs and 7 Clericals. The Agrarians thus soon became the leading 
Czech party and, with the exception of a short interval of the postwar social de-
mocratic primacy, retained that title until the end of the first republic. 
Considering that their rivals, the Young Czechs first and the Social Democrats 
later, enjoyed the sympathies of Czech intellectuals, due to their populär philoso-
phies reflecting the spirit of the time, and disposed of well organized cadres, one 
may wonder what made the Agrarians overcome all those obstacles and retain 
the stewardship of the country for a whole generation. 
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They owed their success partly to luck, and pardy to the courage and wisdom 
of its leader. They were lucky in practically not having a competitor for rural 
votes. All the other parties, except the unpopulär Clericals, focussed their atten­
tion on urban votes. They were not afraid of the Agrarian supremacy, for they 
underestimated the agrarian leadership. The „house-negro" was apparently very 
sure that the „field-negro" cannot compete with him in politics. 
This may have been true in the first elections in which the Agrarian Party took 
part, which were held in 1901. It won then 5 mandates, as against 53 Young 
Czechs 1 8. Under a new leadership, however, it took due notě of its defects and 
at once took steps to remedy them. In 1906 it gave itself for the first time a daily, 
called Venkov (the countryside). Unlike its predecessor, which was a weekly, this 
páper was printed in Prague. At the samé time it succeeded in reforming the elec-
tionary law and made an end to gerrymandering by separating the strictly rural 
districts from the urban and industrial ones. It did more than that. It created a 
variety of front organizations representing not only agricultural but rural interest 
in generál. The party claimed to be the spokesman not only of the big farmers, 
who were its founders, but of all classes of the rural population. The first issue of 
Venkov, of January 29, 1906, introduced the party as the spokesman of all people 
living in the countryside, including the small-holders, crofters, village trades men 
and agricultural workers. Its chief concern throughout its history was the small-
holder, representing some 80 percent of the agricultural population. They had an 
Organization of their own, which was formally only affiliated to the Agrarian 
Party. They also had their own daily, their own representatives in the parliament 
and already during the communal elections of 1919 directives were issued to select 
by preference small-holders in the agricultural villages as party candidates for 
the post of mayor 1 9 . Their very name appeared in the official title of the party 
which was: Republican Party of Farmers and Small-Holders. 
Most of the front organizations embraced farmers producing the samé product. 
There were sugar-beet growers in the low lands and potato-growers on higher 
grounds, there were flax growers, hops growers, milk farmers and a lot of others. 
Organizations like these exist, of course, in all western countries. It was a specialty 
of Czechoslovakia that all of them were affiliated with one party which they ne­
ver dreamt of leaving. 
The third type of front organizations pursued what one might call the edu-
cational or cultural objectives of the party. There was an Organization of farmers' 
wives and daughters, set up to protéct the women folk against the clerical in­
fluence; there soon grew up an Organization of young farmers, of graduates of 
agricultural schools and of College educated people. Likewise village tradesmen, 
teadiers and priests had similar organizations of their own. After the war these 
pursuits culminated in a representative building of an Agricultural Academy, 
conceived as an intellectual center of agrarism. 
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Though agricultural credit cooperatives preceded by a few decades the birth 
of the party, the great days of agricultural cooperatives came in the nineties and 
later under the auspices of the party. The Cooperation was so close that a repre-
sentative of cooperatives, which became an important economic and financial 
power in the country, had a seat in the executive committee of the party. 
As long as they were voting for the Young Czechs the agrarians could be iden-
tified with well-to-do farmers. Under the new leadership they strove to become 
a rural party. That change was not unnoticed by their Sudeten German neighbors 
who set up their own Bund der Landwirte three years later. All these develop-
ments signaling self-determination of the rural population were due to the vision 
of one man, a young farmer from a village lying a few miles south of Prague. 
His name was Antonín Švehla, and the fate of no other party had been so radi-
cally affected by its new leadership as in this čase. He was a son of a well-to-do 
farmer, one of the founders of the party. One of his brothers became a university 
professor and the other a lawyer. He himself was destinned to be a farmer, atten-
ded an agricultural school and then spent a year in Böhmisch-Leipa to learn Ger­
man. From his early years he showed interest in public life. As he grew older he 
supplemented his mediocre education by voracious reading and later travel during 
his reconvalescence from a kidney disease which eventually caused his death at 
the age of 60. Karel Engliš, the minister of finance, in his obituary of Švehla wrote 
that he went to Svehla's school, though he was himself a university professor 2 0. 
He took over his farm after his father's death in 1900, but within a few years 
was up to his neck in politics. Unlike the conservative rank and filé of Czech far­
mers he was from the outset a kind of a radical tory. H e sought to broaden the 
appeal of the party. He believed that in modern times in order to survive politi­
cal parties must become mass parties. He saw in social democracy one such urban 
party, and was determined to make his own party a similar mass party serving 
the interests of the countryside. He was also aware of the weakness of his own 
movement which was lacking wide appeal to the urban intelligentsia, and was facing 
a very different type of issues. He wanted to galvanize the countryside in an age 
of rising industrialism. To reach his objective he chose much less radical slogans 
than were those of urban parties, led by intellectuals. All that he wanted for his 
people was that they should not be discriminated against in an industrial society 
and to that end he chose slogans like „The countryfolks are one big family" and 
„equal among equals". Czech intellectuals no doubt were little attracted to appeals 
of this kind, and he never won any sizable part of them for his cause. Yet in the 
end, as long as he lived, these slogans became in his own country a greater power 
than the dictatorship of the Proletariat of the Communists and Social Democrats 
or „nothing but the nation" of National Democrats. 
He first distinguished himself politically or ideologically during the agitation in 
1905 on behalf of universal suffrage in Austria. His own party, more conservative 
in this respect than the Young Czechs, originally rejected it. Švehla was then not 
yet on the party's governing board, but it was due to his vigorous support of 
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the proposed legislation that in December 1905 the party changed its mind and 
joined the ranks of those who f avored its adoption. 
In 1908 he was elected chairman of the party after being first elected deputy to 
the Bohemian Diet. H e could have been elected to the Austrian Parliament either 
in 1907 or in 1911 but showed no interest in that kind of distinction. „Why Vien-
na", he said at the party congress in 1912, „I always wonder why our people are 
so anxious to get there, why that city attracts them. I believe that Prague is the 
best place where we can show what we can do, rather than Vienna. There I am 
nobody, here we can be everything2 1." 
His second major feat was the assumption of the leading role in the Czech camp 
during the war. Superficial observers, the rank and filé of the Czech intelligentsia, 
perhaps because he spoke so little in public, for a long time regarded him only as 
a dexterous politickn. If we také time to study him, however, we will come to 
the conclusion that he saw further than any non-socialist prewar or wartime poli-
tician, and that he then relentlessly pursued his original objective throughout all 
the years of his public life. He is the only responsible democratic European sta-
tesman who rose to power during the war, remained in power for ten years, and 
his power was all the time growing to reach its zenith in the year when his fatal 
illness forced him to retire from politics. 
Soon after the beginning of the war he came to the conclusion that, regardless 
of who would win the war, after the war in the whole of Europe lying east of 
the Rhine, Social Democrats would play an increasingly important role. H e re-
gretted that for the Czech Social Democrats, good Marxists as they were, national 
aspirations had little attraction, and that some of their leaders sincerely believed 
and worked for German victory. He also knew that Czech socialistic electorate 
felt differently, and he bent all his efforts to change this statě of things and bring 
the Social Democrats, rank and filé into the Czech an ti-Austrian, national camp. 
His first formulation of this policy dates from 1916, that is from the year prece-
ding the Russian revolution and the revival of constitutional life in Austria. H e 
held then a meeting with the leaders of two other main Czech parties, the Social 
Democrats and the Young Czechs, at which an agreement was reached to the ef-
fect that: 
1. It is necessary to resist dictatorship by argument, protest or evasion. 
2. A possibility that war will not end with the break-up of Austria should be 
considered. 
3. This agreement will remain secret. 
4. The Social Democrats will assume the leading role in the creation of a national 
program and will convene the representatives of all Czech parties. 
5. The Young Czechs will make an effort to consolidate the existing urban par­
ties so that there are three pillars: the Social Democrats, the Agrarians and the 
Young Czechs. 
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 K u č e r a / K u č e r o v á 41. 
184 
6. The Clerical Party will be the last one to receive an invitation, and the samé 
applies to the aristocratic land-owners2 2. 
This was the first step in Svehla's wartime policy and he did not deviate later 
from these principles. H e took into account even the least desired Austrian alter­
native; the building-up of a common front for the whole country was his chief 
objective; the new age required that Social Democrats should preside; the urban 
parties must be consolidated; old things should be forgotten and nobody should 
be ostracized. 
Once political life was restored in Austria in 1917 Švehla emerged as the mo­
derátor in the Czech camp. There was at that time, of course, no freedom of the 
press and, moreover, Švehla hated wide publicity of his achievements. Consequent-
ly even after the war most Czechs, fascinated as they were by the achievements 
of Masaryk and Beneš abroad 2 3, little knew or cared about the developments 
which had taken place in the last eighteen months of the war in Prague. They ne­
ver pondered about the fact that from the moment the country had won its free­
dom, thanks to the work that was done in the last months of the war it had 
enjoyed in western capitals the reputation of having an orderly, stable govern-
ment which, incidentally, enabled dr. Beneš in Paris to attain the maximum of his 
objectives. The achievements, real or presumed of Masaryk and Beneš abroad for 
years captivated the whole nation and to cherish them a special historical review 
called Naše revoluce (Our revolution) was created. It never occured to its editors 
that wartime achievements on the home front were as remarkable as those abroad 
and should be popularized in the same periodical. To know the roots of their own 
government should have been as important as knowing the incidents which arou-
sed the interest and sympathy for the Czechoslovak cause abroad and eventually 
admitted it into the family of independet nations. 
Some light on the activities of Švehla during the war was thrown only in the 
thirties by a man who served as liaison between Masaryk's dosest friends at home, 
known as Maffia, and Svehla's office. This is in fact the only report which gives 
a glimpse into Svehla's Workshop during the war. N o similar work about his doings 
while he was in office or out of office after the war is extant. According to this 
reportér: 
„First there was always a meeting in Svehla's office — generál principles, the 
crying national need — then came meetings of executive committees of several par-
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ties ending with an agreement which was reached again in Svehla's office. He had 
the first and the last word, not only as the leader of a great party, certainly not 
because he was an agrarian, but because of his firm belief that the National Com-
mittee was indispensable, because he was patient and able, and had personal au-
thority which enabled him to bridge countless differences. He was a man of com-
promise. When national interests were involved, dr. Rašín and to an extent dr. Kra­
mář were hot-tempered, stubborn and intransigent. Švehla kept his own feelings 
for himself, was winning generál confidence, negotiations came into his hands and 
the center of gravity feil on his Shoulders24." 
After his tireless wooing of the Social Democrats he finally succeeded in brin-
ging them into the national camp. In November 1916 they agreed to join the 
Czech Union, founded by him. That union was created as a spokesman of Czech 
people in the Vienna parliament. In its activity, however, it was to be directed 
and supervised by the National Committee, whose seat was in Prague. Švehla be­
came the secretary of that committee. 
His next wartime achievement took place under very changed circumstances in 
July 1918. By that time Czech people had recovered from their wartime depres-
sion and, sure of the vic'tory of their cause, proceeded to organize in Prague in 
May 1918 a public manifestation on the occasion of an anniversary of the Czech 
National Theater. That manifestation turned out to be a replica of the Congress 
of Oppressed Austrian Nationalities which was held a month before in Rome. 
The presence of Yugoslav guests led to such jubililation that the government had 
to intervene and send the Yugoslavs home 2 5. The fear of a premature Prague rising 
which would have been crushed by the Austrian or German military led then Švehla 
and his friends to reorganize the old National Committee and assign it a new pur-
pose. It was called to life to calm the masses, restore order in Prague and give the 
Czechs the feeling that their future was in good hands. That National Committee 
in fact became a sort of Czech provisional government which after the day of li-
beration merely expanded to become the Revolutionary National Assembly of the 
new country. This transformation was the last of Svehla's acts during the war. To 
effect it he had to succeed in convincing the leaders of all the other parties, the 
Social Democrats being the most important, to accept the relative strength of 
Czech parties in the last prewar elections of 1911 as the pattern to be adopted in 
the composition of the Revolutionary National Assembly, which then remained in 
power until the first regulär elections took place in April 1920 2 6. 
It soon appeared that might have been the last of Svehla's feats. It is true that 
thanks to it his party had in the assembly more mandates than any other. It obtai-
ned in this way 55 deputies as against 53 Social Democrats, 46 National Demo-
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crats, 29 National Socialists (known then as Czechoslovak Socialists), 24 Cleri­
cals, 6 Progressives (Masaryk's own party) and 41 Slovák deputies. But from the 
first months of the republic (rather than from the first days of peace, as was the 
case in Germany and Austria), it became obvious that the revolutionary Social 
Democrats had the main word in the country. 
In the first cabinet Švehla assumed the role of the minister of interior, but soon 
greater responsibility was in störe for him. Dr. Kramář, the premiér, having be­
come the leader of the Czech delegation to the Peace Conference in Versailles in 
January 1919, Švehla was unanimously elected as acting prime minister. He then 
led the government until the communal elections in June 1919 ending with a decisive 
socialist victory which forced him and Kramář to resign. Masaryk then wanted to 
appoint Beneš, but he refused and suggested Švehla instead. Švehla having refused, 
too, suggested a socialist minister, to whom he pledged his party's support to head 
the government. That was the Red-Green coalition. The president then appointed 
Tusar. To exalt their victory the Social Democrats ostracized the National De­
mocrats and the Clericals as reactionaries and excluded them from participation 
in the Tusar cabinet. This punitive measure turned out to be of short duration. 
What mattered more in the end was the defeat of the first socialistic project which 
took place a few months before. That project was their idea of the land reform. 
Briefly stated, the more or less compulsory transfer of large tracts of arable 
land from the hands of the latifundia owners, absentee landlords of non-Czech 
stock, into the hands of the poor peasantry, appeared after the war to most people 
as an act long overdue social justice. How to divide the requisitioned land be­
came, however, a delicate issue. The land reform was to give the socialists the first 
opportunity to bring down by one stroke the last remains of feudalism and lay 
foundations for socialism in agriculture into the bargain. It was their plan to 
nationalize the latifundia and then rent the requisitioned land to socialist collec-
tives. The prospective beneficiaries, the poor peasantry, were unorganized, but 
their dreams and hopes resembled more those of their organized neighbors, the 
slightly better of agrarian farmers. Ownership of the land which he tills is an un-
written article of faith of every peasant. It was not very difficult for Švehla and 
his friends to organize almost overnight in thousands of Czech villages a powerful 
movement of small-holders under the slogan: A free peasant on a free soil. In the 
end the agrarian plan was accepted, and what was meant tö be the first socialist 
triumph became their first major set-back. In this way the revolutionary socialist 
movement was permanently deprived of the support of the rural rear guard, so 
important in the Russian revolution. Small-holders together with the medium-sized 
farmers became the backbone of the Agrarian Party in all the Czechoslovak elec­
tions. 
The main reason why the Revolutionary National Assembly remained for 18 
months in power was that it was assigned the important task of drafting and rati-
fication of the Constitution. It was feared that the presence of disaffected German 
deputies in parliament would greatly complicate that task. That Constitution has 
been described as a „compromise between parties, between the government and the 
Opposition, between different political philosophies, between scholars and politi-
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cians, between the socialists and the bourgeoisie, Catholics and atheists, conserva-
tives and progressives, as well as between the Czechoslovaks and the German mi­
nority which was not yet represented in the parliament" 2 7. The cabinet in power 
had votes enough to ratify the Constitution, but this was not enough for the man 
who took it upon himself to steer the Constitution through the parliament. This 
was not Tusar, the premiér, but Švehla, the minister of the interior. He became 
the soul of the constitutional committee. His ambition was to secure an unanimous 
passage of that document, and thanks to a multitude of compromises described in 
F. Peroutka's Budování státu he fully succeeded. A year or so later in a calmer 
atmosphere, he created the Pětka (the Committee of Five) to help him in similar 
situations. Considering that since December 1919 there existed in parliament an 
embryo of the future Communist Party under the name of the Marxist Left, and 
the government in all its activities was severely taken to task by the ostracized 
National Democrats and Clericals, this last manifestation of unanimity of Czech 
and Slovák deputies, brought about chiefly through the effort of one man, is most 
remarkable. It Stands on record that during those night hours of February 28 and 
29, 1920, the deputies rose 155 times to signify their approval of various constitu­
tional provisions, and that 105 of those votes, thanks to Svehla's compromises, 
were passed without debatě 2 8. 
The parliamentary elections which followed in April 1920 confirmed the socialist 
victory of the preceding year and re-installed Tusar. The Agrarians — Czech and 
Slovák together — were second, but the greatest surprise was the decline of Natio­
nal Democrats who have garnered only 9 percent of the electorate. It thus became 
clear that the Social Democrats and the Agrarians alone could claim to speak for 
the bulk of the Czechoslovak population, and that the Red-Green coalition under 
the circumstances was the best foundation of a democratic regime. 
Before coming to Prague at the end of 1918 Tusar spent the war years in Vienna 
and was consequently not well versed in Czechoslovak politics. The man who 
stood behind him to guide him was Švehla 2 9. He made many friends among the 
Social Democrats during the last years of the war, and was willing to join the go­
vernment, one of whose objectives was gradual socialization of the industry, when 
the country would be ripe for it. The Red-Green coalition, a partnership of wor­
kers and peasants, unlike in Russia, was steered by a peasant leader and a good 
democrat. The Social Democrats, even after the communist secession at the end of 
1920, remained Marxists, while to the Czech and Slovák peasantry Marxism was 
an anathema. The partnership in fact existed only between the agrarian and so­
cialist leaders, and was originally meant only as a stop-gap to prevent or attenuate 
the ideological warfare. It lasted longer than was expected. Švehla knew that his 
Social Democrats were red on the outside, but white inside. In 1919 and 1920 he 
too was horrified by the behavior of the socialist masses. H e rejected their doctrine, 
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yet during their long, lean years which had followed the communist secession, 
refused to let them down. He behaved like an elder brother of the reborn or half-
reformed Social Democracy. The absence of such a man, party and policy in Au­
stria and Germany explains why until the Hitler era, when Czechoslovakia had a 
different kind of leadership, that country succeeded where the other two democra-
cies had failed. 
The resounding socialist victory in the 1920 election was of short duration. No 
one was more aware of it than the socialists themselves. By that time it became 
evident that the radical wing of the party, the Marxist Left, was by far superior 
in strength in the electorate. The leading socialist páper was in its hands. They 
attacked Tusar, disavowed him, and in the end he was not even able to build a 
definite cabinet. The end of the party squable came in September 1919 when a 
group of modernes assumed power, postponed the party congress, which threa-
tened to reveal their own weakness, excommunicated the Communists and left the 
government to have free hands for the forthcoming encounter with them. Thus 
ended the era of what one may call creeping socialism in Czechoslovakia. 
These unexpected developments led Masaryk and the moderate Social Democrats 
as well as Švehla, the leading man in the non-socialist camp, to resort to the ex-
pediency of a cabinet of officials, that is, administrative experts. This was an 
emasculated cabinet. Masaryk bade it to carry on the policy of the preceding, 
socialistic cabinet30. Instead it opened an era in Czechoslovak politics when it 
became an executive organ of a new, discreet political organism which sprang up 
to its support behind the scene. It became soon known as Pětka, the Committee 
of Five. Led by Švehla, who probably regarded it as a new edition of the equally 
discreet National Committee which he created and led in the last months of the 
war, this committee, consisting of the spokesmen of the leading parties: the Agra­
rians, the Social Democrats, the Czechoslovak Socialists, the National Democrats 
and the Clericals, soon became the real boss of the country. It was doing its work 
to generál satisfaction and governed the country in domestic affairs also under the 
two following cabinets, the first one headed by Beneš and the other by Švehla. 
Without any protest by the cabinet of officials it actually assumed the role of dic-
tator in the field of economic and social legislation. 
The rejection of their pian of the land reform, the subsequent gradual disinte-
gration of the Social Democratic Party into its democratic and communist fac-
tions, followed by Svehla's steady support of the disillusioned Social Democrats 
was a most significant political development in the first decase of the country. It 
mitigated the class struggle, gave stability to the regime, and incidentally turned 
Svehla's party into the vital center of the country. Its effects became apparent in 
many ways. It led to the merger of the Slovák National and Peasant Party with 
the Czech Agrarians, although the leadership of the Slovák party was in urban 
hands, that is in a sense closer to Czech National Democrats. It aroused the interest 
of the German farmers and their party and made German peasantry the first 
group to abandon irredentism and seek contacts with their Czech counterpart. It 
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also made it possible to bring in 1921 under the same roof the Social Democrats 
and their former arch-enemies, National Democrats and Clericals and in this way 
somehow revive the spirit of 1918. 
The Pětka was born almost on the same day as the Cerny's first cabinet of offi­
cials. The cabinet prepared a budget which had to be ratified. The leaders of the 
five parties met and agreed, and for a time were then called the budget majority. 
Then they regularly met to discuss and agree on important legislation, something 
which a parliament consisting of 300 individuals was totally unable to do. The 
partnership had to remain secret to prevent the Social Democrats from being at-
tacked by unscrupulous leftist intellectuals. In December 1920 this committee stood 
behind the government when it resolutely liquidated the generál strike organized 
by the dissident communists illegally occupying the buildings belonging to the 
Social Democrats. Step by step they carried out a non-violent counter-revolution 
directed at the same time against communism and Czech, Slovák and German 
ultra-nationalism3 1. The underlying conviction, which was only then accepted 
also by the Social Democrats, was that a modern, progressive society should be 
pluralistic, and that none of its components should be allowed to carry out ruth-
lessly its objectives, that is, in this case, that each of the parties has the right of 
veto 3 2 . That committee until 1926 was the directive force of all the cabinets. It 
also became the school of democracy for the other parties, and it was only under 
its patronage that democracy definitely took root in Czechoslovakia. 
The Cerny's cabinet of officials having after a years of Service outlived its use-
fulness was supplanted by a cabinet led by dr. Beneš. It was widely believed by 
the Czech people that once the spectre of communism was dispelled the country 
would rally and consolidate and it was expected that Benes's cabinet would carry 
out this task. That turned out to be a mistake. For various reasons, the most im­
portant one being dr. Benes's intense dislike of the Pětka, there was no consolida-
tion 3 3. The trouble with dr. Beneš was that, though he was the youngest of all 
ministers and had no experience in politics of his own country, still regarded him­
self as an authority even in this field and was outspoken in this respect. This pro-
duced ill-feeling between him and the leading parties so that three months after 
having assumed power he was ready to resign 3 4. His successor apparently being 
not yet ready, he had to hold the post for a whole year. 
That successor was Švehla. He became premiér in October 1922 and remained 
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in power for nearly three years. He inherited from the Beneš cabinet the title of 
the second cabinet of consolidation, made some progress in that sense by giving 
posts to the other members of the Pětka in his cabinet, but even his talent for 
compromises could not bring about the desirable consolidation. In the end his go­
vernment ended with a universal desire for national elections to end in that way 
a prolonged, unpleasant feud between the Agrarians and the Social Democrats. 
The reason was that some people had a ground to believe that since the war their 
own interests were continuously pushed aside and that the time had arrived that 
they should receive due attention. The chief national segment which felt that way 
were the farmers. In the first postwar years that class indeed was the only econo-
mically sound and productive dement of the national Community. Sugar pro-
duced from beet was for a few years by far the most important article of export 
and so to say the only source of national income. It was then talked about as the 
country's white gold. In the mid-twenties, however, bad times had arrived for 
the farmer, due to the cheap American and east European wheat. The farmers de-
manded protection and since 1924 made protection a national issue. In the end a 
deal was made with the socialists. The price the Agrarians were willing to pay was 
advanced social legislation for the industrial working class. In October 1924 that 
legislation was enacted, but the socialists then suddenly reneged on their promise. 
They pleaded that agrarian tariffs would raise the price of foodstuffs which on 
the forthcoming election would redound to the benefit of the Communists at their 
own expense. An angry farmers' reaction to their decision led then to a premature 
dissolution of the parliament and to election in November 1925. 
As the election of 1920 revealed the weakness of the National Democrats, so 
that of 1925 brought to light a noteworthy decline of the second rival, the Social 
Democrats. In 1920 they garnered 37 percent of the total Czechoslovak vote. Five 
years later they sank to a little less than 9 percent 3 5. They became the fourth 
largest party, the chief beneficiaries being the Communists. The Agrarians in their 
turn slightly grew in strength and their dominant position in Czechoslovak politics 
was generally recognized. Subsequently the second of Svehla's cabinets was pat-
ched up. I t lasted only a few months and was then replaced by the second Cerny's 
cabinet of officials when it was unable to meet the agrarian demands. 
A significant development in Czech politics took place in the middle of 1926. 
Under the pressure of circumstances a new, hitherto passive if not rebellious de­
ment was introduced into the government. I t did not dränge its nature, but in an 
unexpected way helped the non-socialistic, that is, bourgeois segment of Czech po­
pulation to reach its objective. The first postwar years had demonstmed that the 
aims of the socialists could be at least partially realized without the support of the 
German minority. The developments of 1926 showed that the Czech and German 
non-socialist middle class, led by their peasantry, could be respected only by 
joining hands. A parliamentary majority necessary for passing agricultural tariffs 
as well as for giving assistance to the clergy, the only kind of „civil servants" 
3 5
 O l i v o v á , Věra / K v a č e k , Robert: Dějiny Československa od roku 1918 do 
roku 1948 [History of Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1948]. Prague 1967, p. 134. 
191 
whose claims to a decent living the socialist parties never recognized, was then 
built in the face of violent protests and manifestations that took place in Prague. 
The Opposition was headed partly by Communists and partly by the radical wing 
of the Castle group. 
The necessary legislation was enacted under the Černý cabinet. The Sudeten 
German Bund der Landwirte and the Christian Socials, having demonstrated their 
common interests with their Czech counterparts, have in October 1926 entered 
the Svehla's third cabinet, which was later also joined by the hitherto dissident 
Slovák Populists and Czech National Democrats. The whole transaction took 
place rather suddenly. It was not preceded by any lengthy investigations, studies 
and deliberations, and it could then be expected that it would not have a long 
life. But it turned out to be a well considered move, and incidentally a demonstra-
tion of the vitality of Czechoslovak democracy. The example set by the two Ger­
man parties was three years later followed by the German Social Democrats, 
and a year later by the spokesmen of the German industry (DAWG). After the 
1929 elections the German National Party as well as National Socialists issued 
statements announcing their willingness to cooperate effectivdy in the building 
of a new government3 6. So long as the country's chief concern was domestic peace, 
stability and wellfare rather than desire to play a spectacular, adventurous, role 
in world politics, the problém of the German minority was far less serious than 
coming to terms with a variety of more or less radical Czech social revolutionaries. 
Svehla's last significant achievement was the role he played in 1927 in the presi-
dential elections. Masaryk was elected already twice: in November 1918 by ac-
clamation, and in May 1920 by the first duly elected National Assembly. The 
Constitution specifically stated that the provision that no president should hold 
office for more than two successive terms did not apply to the first president. 
Masaryk's prestige stood at its peak in the first two postwar years. H e was a 
man of strong views and hence was bound to have critics, if not enemies. By and 
by two things were held against him by many people. It was said that his own 
and particularly dr. Benes's Version of events which induced the Allied and Asso­
ciated Powers during the last months of the War to recognize the Czechoslovak 
National Council in Paris as the provisional government of the future Czechoslo­
vakia, for one reason or another downgraded the role of the Czechoslovak Legion 
in Siberia in the summer months of 1918. The view that the country owed its 
independence primarily if not soldy to Masaryk's and Benes's wisdom and diplo-
macy rather than to the spectacular, unexpected rising of the Czech Legion in 
Russia and its victorious march across Siberia, which for a while astonished the 
world and made the word Czechoslovak known abroad, seemed to the critics of 
both these men, the so-called anti-Castle group, outrageous and unsupported by 
any evidence3 7. The second thing held against the president by many was his re-
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peated identification with socialism. What was aggravating to them was that he 
did not do so only in the first postwar years, when such a profession might have 
been comprehensible for the head of a semi-socialist State. H e kept on doing so 
from time to time even when the spell of socialism in our time was broken and 
socialists east or west were on the retreat. Was it not his duty in view of the emi­
nent position he held to stand above the parties in word and deed? 
The presidential election was an occasion for Masaryk's critics to get together, 
think hard and then make an effort to complement the bourgeöis cabinet with a 
bourgeois president. The president was elected by the National Assembly, that is, 
by both houses. Since there was a bourgeois majority in both houses, the problém 
of electing a non-socialist president appeared not too difficult. 
Ideas like these were entertained in national democratic, clerical and some agra­
rian circles for more than a year before the date of election. Švehla appeared to 
these people as the safest candidate. His popularity in parliament indeed not only 
never declined, but as the years went by was steadily mounting. He probably 
would have been elected, had he so desired, but there was nothing in the presiden­
tial office that would attract him 3 8. Moreover, he believed that the rejection of 
Masaryk would strike many as rejection of the spirit of 1918, of the ideals of so­
cial justice and international good-will, of which he appeared to be an embody-
ment. Nor could he forget that Masaryk with his immense prestige stood by when 
he was forging the Red-Green coalition, the Committee of Five and the subse-
quent cabinets, little as these Svehla's instruments, predicated on the Community 
of principles i. e. rules of conduct, and interests, tallied with Masaryk's notion that 
cabinets should be based on common ideologies. In the end the election of Masa­
ryk was ensured when, months before it took place, Švehla came out openly in 
favor of Masaryk. He had not only brought all the agrarian electors, but also 
those of the German Agrarians, German Christian Socials and Czech Small Tra-
ders to give him their vote 3 9. 
In October 1927 and then again in March 1928 Švehla feil seriously ill. Although 
it was doubtful that he would ever recover his health and work again, the party 
leaders agreed that he should remain in power during the whole year in which 
the country was celebrating its tenth anniversary. That was their way of saying 
that he had deserved well of his country. 
Svehla's conception of democracy, the way he introduced it and the method he 
used in reaching his objectives were not universally accepted. They were indeed 
hardly understood and with few exceptions never seriously studied. Czech intelli­
gentsia from the first days of the republic had its eyes fixed on the contest bet­
ween articulate heralds of two contemporary philosophies, Kramář, the spokesman 
of Czech nationalism, and Masaryk, the herald of Czech progressive liberalism. In 
Czech thinking there was no room for a third person, and Švehla was too busy 
building up the State to be interested in ideological squabbles. His only serious enemy 
was the radical wing of the so-called Castle Group, influential chiefly behind the 
scene, not to speak of the noisy, but harmless communists. These anti-establishment 
3 8
 P e r o u t k a 1505. 
3 9
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people, who since the mid-twenties gathered around dr. Beneš, deplored Masaryk's 
and Social democrats' trust in Švehla, whom they regarded as the main pillar of 
the bourgeois establishment. In their eyes he was only a crafty peasant, who never 
wrote a book and who, moreover, to reach his objectives by preference resorted 
to such „undemocratic" and „immoral" tools as compromises and the use of two 
irons in the fire. As it was their own favorite tool in politics all too often was cha­
racter assassination40. 
Against Svehla's idea to broaden the interdependence from the Committee of 
Five to all the other parties and sectors of the country, irrespective of their lan-
guage or ideology, there stood Benes's conception of democracy which sought to 
give Czech policy a distinct ideological coloring, to equate the adjective Czecho­
slovak with the adjective progressive and to do so by eliminating from Czech poli­
tics everything that was reactionary or conservative, the Agrarian Party first of 
all. Benes's conception of democracy, which had no analogy in any western Eu­
ropean country, sought to transform the bourgeois democracy into a higher stage 
of democracy, which he called the „rule of the fourth estate" 4 1. H e could not do 
very much to bring this about even when he became president, but the London 
Exile Government, in which he was more or less a dictators finally gave him a 
chance. There, after having signed his pact with Russia in 1943, he had found a 
partner among the Czech communists, who believed, too, that the days of bourgeois 
democracy were numbered. On his return to his country after the war, the „rule 
of the fourth estate" became people's democracy. This was understood by dr. Be­
neš to be a bridge between Moscow and the West. It became instead everywhere 
only a communist anti-chambre. 
One of the first acts of the new regime was the liquidation of the Agrarian Party 
as well as of the National Democrats and the Small Traders Party. They were all 
blamed for displaying a signál lack of patriotism bordering on treason during the 
Munich days, weeks and months. The story, however, is not that simple. 
4 0
 Two months after Munich and after dr. Benes's resignation, there appeared in Prague 
a book entitled: Kramář in Judgment over Beneš. This was a posthumous work of dr. 
Kramař, who died a year before. It teils the story of about a dozen officials whose 
career had been cut short and who were victimized for no other reason than that they 
did not share dr. Benes's philosophy. Character assassination was the method employed 
in each case. In his discussions with the Czech leaders of the Communist Party, held 
in Moscow in December 1943, dr. Beneš went on record that he „as minister of foreign 
affairs and as president had executed quite a few ambassadors, but unfortunately not 
enough of them". Cesta ke květnu [Road to May]. Prague 1966, p. 49. 
4 1
 The replacement of the bourgeois democracy by the rule of the „fourth estate" was 
for Beneš a crucial issue and subject of many of his talks. He cautiously formulated 
his ideas on this subject in his book, Democracy Today and Tomorrow, based on the 
lectures he held in 1939 at the Chicago University. He spoke on the same theme in 
Paris on October 18, 1932, when he was addressing the Academy of Moral and Poli­
tical Sciences. His Statement was: „La bourgeoisie a triomphé souš l'ancien regime. De 
1830 ä 1890 eile a réussi a prendre la haute main en Europe. A partir de 1848 se dresse 
á cóté ďelle un Quatriěme Etat, dont l'influence s'etend sur toute la société euro-
péenne . . . Le Quatriěme Etat, 1'homme modeme, nous plante, la France et nous touš, 
devant la question fatale: ce que nous apporte aujourď hui et ce que cera demain . . ." 
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The Agrarian Party in 1935 originally opposed the election of dr. Beneš as 
president. It did so because it was keenly aware of his overweening ambition to 
play a role in international affairs and have a hand in determining the fate and 
shape of Europe. Švehla, on the other hand, believed that the country should strive 
to avoid involvement in the quarrels of others 4 2. The party subconsciously follo­
wed in that way the admonition given in 1848 by Havlíček when he warned his 
people against accepting the invitation, which had come from the Frankfurter Vor­
parlament, to také part in its deliberations. This admonition was expressed in the 
form of a doggerei, known to every Czech child, but little respected by dr. Beneš 4 3 : 
„Jack, don't go skating with gentlemen. It often happens that a gentleman has a 
slip and the poor man breaks his leg." As the tension between Czechoslovakia and 
Germany was from year to year growing, the agrarian press from time to time 
became the voice of Czech Cassandra. Events had unfortunately shown that their 
fears were justified. It was never forgotten its temerity. As the war was ending, dr. 
Beneš came to the conclusion that it should be severely punished for having distru-
sted his foolhardy policy, rather than praised for its foresight. This was one more 
reason why it was liquidated. The third reason was that it was obvious that the 
three bourgeois parties doomed to death would dislike dr. Benes's close ties and 
his hob-nobbing with Stalin, and for all we know would be able to frustrate the 
new regime's people's democratic legislation and policies. 
The disappearance of the Agrarian Party after the war was noted by all students 
of eastern Europe, but so far no western student has taken pains to investigate 
the charges raised against it, though it has been invariably described as the main 
pillar of Czechoslovak democracy. It is worth noting, however, that the Mamatey-
Luza's symposium, A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918—1948, regarded 
as a standard work on this subject in English, published in 1973, avoids in its 
story of Munich to mention this presumably very important fact. It appears that 
4 2
 In the words of Švehla, who died in 1933, „no enemy has ever failed me, but friends 
almost always did. In our foreign policy we should always strive to stay out of wars 
in which others are involved. "We should také a lesson from the peasant. He has to 
maintain good relations with all his neighbors, particularly with the nearest ones. 
Should his house be on fire, it is the nearest rather than the distant one that will come 
to help. A small nation cannot be a match for a big country. It cán always and should 
strive to come to terms with it, but it must see the danger and také the necessary steps 
in time." H a 1 í k , Rudolf: Švehla ve fotografii [Švehla in photography]. Prague 1935. 
— Had Beneš accepted the proposition of a pact ä la polonaise, as he himself described 
it, made to him by Hitler in October and December 1936 through his two emissaries, 
war would not have been averted. Hitler being what he was, would have eventually 
Struck somewhere eise. The Czechs being what they were, would then soon be involved. 
Their country would have been overrun and devastated, but they would not have the 
feeling of being betrayed by the West, there would not have been any fatal estrangement 
of the German minority nor any Munich Conference, no embitterment against France 
and England and they would have no reason to rush into the Russian bear's arms. The 
country and its neighbors might have then emerged from the war merely „finlandized". 
4 3
 In the last days of his life dr. Beneš in a message addressed to his former secretary, 
dr. E. Táborský, wrote: „My greatest mistake was that I refused to believe to the very 
last that even Stalin lied to me cynically both in 1935 and later, and that his assurances 
to me and Masaryk were an intentional deceit." E. T á b o r s k ý : Beneš and Stalin — 
Moscow 1943 and 1945. JCEA (July 1953). 
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this may be an outstanding modem čase of character assassination, a forgotten dos-
sier for a modem Dreyfuss affair — perhaps because, in the words of Chamber-
lain, it happened, in a far away country of which we know nothing — the victim 
in this čase being a whole peasant class. 
In December 1918 Masaryk returned to bis country as a messenger of Wilsonian 
democracy, which the country presumably then adopted. Svehla's slogan, when 
he was building his party before the war in rebellion against the maternal urban 
party of Young Czechs, was „equal among equals". By this he meant and deman-
ded square deal for the Czech peasantry, which reminds more of the way of thin-
king of Theodore Roosevelt than of Wilson. Masaryk indeed stood ín his thinking 
close to Wilson, but all the great political and social achievements of the Czecho­
slovak regime had found their main source of strength in the principle „equal among 
equals", the Czech agrarian conception of democracy. Under that slogan in 1919 
Švehla with the Social Democrats formed the Red-Green coalition, and later, when 
the Social Democrats broke down, kept it alive; a year later it became the ruling 
principle of the Committee of Five; in 1922 Slovák autonomists came to life with 
that principle on their banner, and so did the German parties in 1926 when they 
had entered the government. In the mid-thirties it became the slogan of the mo-
derate wing of the Sudeten-German Party. During the Second World War it was 
in vain advocated by the German Social Democrats in London. Finally after the 
war, when the Agrarian Party on trumped up charges was liquidated by the com­
munists without any protest and with füll support of the radical wing of the 
Castle Group, their fellow-conspirators, it soon appeared on the banner of the 
non-communist members of the National Front as the last living symbol of the 
First Republic. 
Czech peasantry, which in the First Republic had contributed so significantly 
to the good name of the country both in the West and in the East 4 4, ceased to 
play an active role in the country after 1945. Their substantial part of the Czech 
population, living in some 10 000 Czech villages, was deprived of the right to vote 
for the representatives from their own ranks, and was left free in the elections of 
1946, commonly described in western text-books as free, either to vote for the 
representatives of the four urban parties of the National Front, led by urban peo­
ple, who in the past had never shown any interest in agricultural problems and 
looked at the farmers askance, or not to vote at all. Such was the end of the era 
„equal among equals", which the farmers' party had presented to the country and 
which subsequently became the quintessence of Czechoslovak democracy. The 
events of February 1948, which had caused much alarm in the West, in fact only 
completed the infamous and foolish work initiated in May 1945 by fratricide and 
other atrocities, implying for the saké of a chiméra wanton rejection of most poli­
tical and moral values arduously accumulated during the glorious first seventeen 
years of the First Republic. 
4 4
 „In reality among the European countries after the War Czechoslovakia was one of 
the few states enjoying internal peace and a peaceful foreign policy." A notě of the 
Soviet government of March 16, 1939, sent by Litvinov to the German ambassador 
von Schulenburg. 
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D I E T S C H E C H I S C H E B A U E R N B E W E G U N G , 
I H R F Ü H R E R U N D D E S S E N P A R T E I 
Die tschechische Agrarpartei entstand um die Jahrhundertwende. Die tschechische 
Bauernbewegung verdankt ihr Entstehen dem Nichtvorhandensein einer tschechisch 
sprechenden Aristokratie. 
In den Anfängen war sie eine Bewegung der Großbauern, doch schon bald hatte 
die Partei einen neuen Führer, einen jungen, intelligenten Bauern, der diese Grup-
penpartei in eine Massenpartei umwandeln wollte, die alle Gruppen der ländlichen 
Bevölkerung erfassen sollte. Sein Name war Antonín Švehla. Seine Bemühungen 
hatten vollen Erfolg, besonders durch die Landreform, die der Partei die Stimmen 
der Kleinbauern brachte. 
Švehla verstand nicht nur die Bedürfnisse der kleinen Landbesitzer, sondern auch 
die der Industriearbeiter. Während des Ersten Weltkrieges brachte er die sozial-
demokratischen Führer in sein Lager und in der neuen Republik, als er allmählich 
Regierungschef wurde, waren diese immer unter seinen treuen Anhängern. Auf diese 
Weise gewann er auch das Vertrauen von Masaryk, einem Sozialisten eigener Prä-
gung. Zuerst bildete er die rot-grüne Koalitionsregierung und dann, nach der Los-
lösung der Kommunisten im Jahre 1920, rief er das Fünferkomitee ins Leben, be-
stehend aus den Leitern der fünf führenden Parteien, die letztlich die drei aufein-
anderfolgenden Kabinette stützten und führten. Diesem Komitee verdankt das 
Land seine stabile Regierung und seine Demokratie. 
Diese Demokratie stand unter dem Wahlspruch der Agrarier: „Gleiche unter 
Gleichen". Ihr Geist beherrschte die rot-grüne Koalition, die Arbeit der Fünf und 
bewirkte später die Teilnahme der deutschen Parteien und der slowakischen Volks-
partei an der bürgerlichen Koalition von 1926. 
Die Wahl von Dr. Beneš zum Präsidenten im Jahre 1935 kam durch eine neue 
Koalition zustande, die tschechische Volksfront, die aus denselben Parteien bestand, 
die nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg als Volksdemokratie an die Macht kamen. Die 
Agrarpartei mißtraute der Selbstüberschätzung von Dr. Beneš und teilte weder sei-
nen Glauben an Stalin noch sein Vertrauen in den guten Willen und den Patriotis-
mus der Kommunisten. Dies ist als der Hauptgrund für das Verbot dieser Partei 
nach dem Kriege zu betrachten. 
Die Agrarpartei ist ein Symbol der Ersten Republik, deren westliche Form einer 
Demokratie Dr. Beneš in eine „höhere Demokratie" zu verwandeln hoffte, und 
zwar in der Form einer Herrschaft des vierten Standes. 
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